Description: Organizational Learning at NASA : The Columbia and Challenger Accidents, Paperback by Mahler, Julianne G.; Casamayou, Maureen Hogan, ISBN 1589012666, ISBN-13 9781589012660, Brand New, Free shipping in the US The government investigation into the Columbia space shuttle disaster in 2003 found similarities to the Challenger disaster 17 years earlier, leading the Columbia Accident Investigation Board to conclude that NASA failed to learn from the earlier tragedy. Mahler (government and politics, George Mason University) offers an account of the processes that constitute organizational learning, then looks at what NASA did and didn't do in response to the two disasters. Th discusses factors such as deficiencies in the safety monitoring systems, excessive external political and budgetary pressures, an obstructive organizational culture, and the difficulties of coordination between NASA and its very large number of contractors. Th concludes with a broadly applicable set of propositions about learning in public organizations. Annotation ©2009 Book News, Inc., Portland, OR ()
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Book Title: Organizational Learning at NASA : The Columbia and Challenger Acc
Number of Pages: 256 Pages
Publication Name: Organizational Learning at NASA : the Challenger and Columbia Accidents
Language: English
Publisher: Georgetown University Press
Publication Year: 2009
Subject: Public Affairs & Administration, Organizational Development
Type: Textbook
Item Weight: 13.6 Oz
Item Length: 9 in
Author: Julianne G. Mahler
Subject Area: Political Science, Business & Economics
Series: Public Management and Change Ser.
Item Width: 6 in
Format: Trade Paperback
