Description: The Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-1918 Volume IV The Australian Imperial Force in France 1917 by C. E. W. Bean (Charles Edwin Woodrow Bean) This is the 1982 Hardback facsimile reprint of the 1943 Edition (with a new Introduction) “Early in 1917 the AIF was beginning to gather its wits after Fromelles, Pozières and a bitter winter. It had become used to France, and it had learnt what German artillery and machine-guns could do. A new capacity was informing its operations; and it was developing that combination of skill and aggression which made it so formidable in 1918.” (Introduction by Bill Gammage) ___________________________________ “C.E.W. Bean wrote of 1917 as the low point of the war. In 1917 cold, mud, and German artillery destroyed individuals without discrimination, and Bean wrote the 1917 volume during the depression years - a fact which may have affected his mood when describing the AIF in France in 1917. At Gallipoli, Bean was amongst the front line soldiers where he believed a historian should be, to follow the day-to-day existence of the fighting men. C.E.W. Bean was a remarkable man, author of six of the twelve volumes of The Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-1918. He was Australia's official correspondent during World War I. At Gallipoli from the landing on 25 April until December 1915, he was wounded in action but refused to be evacuated. He acted as a messenger and brought in wounded under tire. Indeed, he was even recommended for the Military Cross but as a civilian was ineligible to receive it. At the end of the war Bean returned to Turkey to study again the battlefield. When he actually came to write his histories he used not only his own notes but information from soldiers which he had gathered both during the war and later when he checked all his research from many points of view. Rarely before had official military history been so readable. In fact Bean's work became the model for war historians and is studied in military academies and colleges throughout the world. After the AIF's terrible losses on the Somme and at Fromelles in 1916, the 1917 volume opens with plans for the coming twelve months. These were set back however when the Germans carried out an extensive evacuation. Its completion found the Germans behind well prepared defences, which the Entente forces, including the Australians, attacked with little real success for the rest of the year.” Front cover and spine Further images of this book are shown below Publisher and place of publication Dimensions in inches (to the nearest quarter-inch) St Lucia: University of Queensland Press 5¼ inches wide x 8¼ inches tall Edition Length 1982 [first published in 1933; this volume is a reprint of the 1943 edition] [xxxii] + 1,030 pages Condition of covers Internal condition Original brown cloth blocked in gilt on the spine with a author and title in a black panel. The covers are slightly rubbed but remain quite fresh, having been protected by the dust-jacket. The spine ends and corners are bumped. The text is clean throughout though the paper has tanned with age, more noticeably in the margins. As is typical with these University of Queensland Press reprints the reproduced illustrations are not of the highest quality. The edge of the text block is dust-stained and grubby. Dust-jacket present? Other comments Yes: however, the dust-jacket is scuffed, rubbed and creased around the edges, with some chipping to the ends of the flap folds, and at the ends of the spine panel. As for the previous Volume in the series this is another great doorstop of a book, which shows some signs of use but remains in good condition, in a scuffed and creased dust-jacket. Illustrations, maps, etc Contents Please see below for details, but please note that the standard of the reproduced illustrations is not of the same quality as the original Editions. Please see below for details Post & shipping information Payment options The packed weight is approximately 1600 grams. Full shipping/postage information is provided in a panel at the end of this listing. Payment options : UK buyers: cheque (in GBP), debit card, credit card (Visa, MasterCard but not Amex), PayPal International buyers: credit card (Visa, MasterCard but not Amex), PayPal Full payment information is provided in a panel at the end of this listing. The A. I. F. in France, 1917 Contents List of Illustrations List of Maps Chronology for 1917 Preface to University of Queensland Press Edition by Robert O'Neill Introduction to University of Queensland Press Edition by Bill Gammage Preface to First Edition Chapter I – Plans of the Allies for 1917 Chapter II – The Winter Ends. Stormy Trench Chapter III – The German Plan, 1917, and its Immediate Result Chapter IV – The Germans Retire Chapter V – The Occupation of Bapaume. Discord in the High Command Chapter VI – The Advanced Guards Chapter VII – The Taking of the Outpost Villages Chapter VIII – Arras, and the Genesis of the Bullecourt Plan Chapter IX – The First Battle of Bullecourt Chapter X – Lagnicourt – the German Counter–stroke Chapter XI – Nivelle’s Offensive, and the “Second Bullecourt” Plan Chapter XII – The Second Battle of Bullecourt Chapter XIII – The Second Battle of Bullecourt (II) Chapter XIV – The Flanders Plan. The 3rd Division Chapter XV – The Battle of Messines – June 7th Chapter XVI – Holding the Gains at Messines Chapter XVII – The Third Battle of Ypres Chapter XVIII – Step by Step. (1) The Menin Road Chapter XIX – Second Step – Polygon Wood Chapter XX – Third Step – Broodseinde Ridge Chapter XXI – The Plan Breaks Down. Passchendaele I – October 9th Chapter XXII – Passchendaele II – October 12th Appendix 1 – The Mines at Hill 60 Appendix 2 – The 2nd Tunnelling Company in the Affair at Nieuport Appendix 3 – Work of 3rd Tunnelling Company at Hill 70 Index List of Illustrations Troops returning along a duckboard track to one of their camps at Delville Wood An infantry billet at Flesselles, winter of 1916-17 The frosts of January, 1917 At the water point, Bernafay Wood, January, 1917 Intelligence officer addressing Germans captured at “ Stormy Trench ” The Butte of Warlencourt and the Quarry Mouth of a dugout at The Maze Loupart Wood and trees of Grevillers “ Knotty Point,” north-west of Thilloy ‘‘ Till Trench ” 2nd Pioneer Battalion filling in a mine-crater on the main road near Bapaume German infantry withdrawing past a crater Supports of the 30th Battalion on the Cambrai road, 17th March, 1917 A mounted patrol passing through Bapaume Bapaume after capture The north-easternmost house of Beaumetz, in which the last party of Germans held out on 24th March, 1917 A battery of the 12th (Army) Brigade, A.F.A., taking position south-west of Vaulx-Vraucourt, 20th March, 1917 The street in Lagnicourt up which Captain Cherry’s party advanced on 26th March, 1917 Boursies View from the brick yard at Hermies Bullecourt, from the German lines Bullecourt, from the Australian lines at Noreuil The 4th Pioneer Battalion shifting its camp to Fremicourt The I Anzac R.E. Workshops, Meaulte A post of the 22nd Machine Gun Company firing at a German aeroplane A Stokes mortar in the Hindenburg Line Messines under bombardment One of the bridges laid across the Douve A “pillbox” at Messines “Huns’ Walk” and a pillbox in the Oosttaverne Line near Septieme Barn Position taken up by the 1st Division’s artillery on July 3rst near "Zouave Wood" Headquarters’ dugout of the 105th Howitzer Battery at Hill 60 Effect of a big German shell, Hazebrouck Ypres Australians resting beside the ramparts at Ypres Bellewaarde Lake “ Anzac ” pillbox “ Garter Point ” Pillboxes at Nonne Bosschen Pillboxes at Polygoneveld, Polygon Wood, and the Butte The 7th Brigade’s line at Polygoneveld, 2Ist September, 1917 Part of the I Anzac system of communications near Birr Cross- Road The scene at Hooge dump on 25th September, 1917, after its explosion Polygon Wood and the Butte .. Zonnebeke brick kiln and church Crater on Broodseinde Ridge, scene of the fight at the Headquarters of the I/5th Foot Guard and II/212th R.I.R., 4th October, 1917 One of the captured field-guns on Broodseinde Ridge The Australian front on Broodseinde Ridge Headquarters of the 24th Battalion on Broodseinde Ridge, 5th October Observers on Broodseinde Ridge Germans captured on October 4th at Broodseinde A howitzer bogged in the Hannebeek Valley Zonnebeke Valley in the autumn Artillerymen hauling an 18-pounder into position on Westhoek Ridge List of Maps 1 The area from Bapaume to the Hindenburg Line 2 The battlefield of Bullecourt, 11th April, 1917 3 The situation at Messines at 11.30 a.m., 7th June, 1917 4 The battlefield east of Ypres, 19th September, 1917 The Australian Imperial Force in France, 1917 Introduction by Bill Gammage Early in 1917 the AIF was beginning to gather its wits after Fromelles, Pozières and a bitter winter. It had become used to France, and it had learnt what German artillery and machine–guns could do. A new capacity was informing its operations; and it was developing that combination of skill and aggression which made it so formidable in 1918. C.E.W. Bean’s chief interest was in the character of the AIF and the men who composed it, but he begins his 1917 volume with an account of Allied plans for the coming year. He presumed (wrongly as it transpired) that the British Official Histories would analyse these adequately, and he used them merely as background to his description of Australian front line activity. Here and elsewhere he wrote lucid summaries of the conduct of the war, but his level of detail would rarely satisfy a serious student of politics, command, or staff work, and when he described battle the higher command almost vanished from his narrative. Roughly seven of his 1917 chapters outline the various Allied plans during the year, and one chapter describes the brilliant German withdrawal of February-April which so seriously disrupted those plans. All should be read not as narratives of planning and strategy, but as aids in telling the story of the AIF. During the first third of 1917 Allied planning was dominated by Nivelle, the engaging and energetic Frenchman whose strategy, albeit put more exhilaratingly, was essentially what had failed in 1916: to punch through the German defences on the Western Front, pour through the gap in overwhelming force, roll up the German rear, and sweep to victory. This plan demanded a concentration of the French infantry, and this in turn required the British to extend their front and to make diversionary attacks, including those involving the Australians at Bullecourt in April and May. Nivelle failed. His attempt wore down the French Army, and to relieve their allies the British took the offensive in June. Their strategic problem remained what it had always been: how to crack the German defences. Head-on assault had failed in 1916 and early in 1917. In June at Messines a new method was tried: long and careful preparation against a particular enemy position, a huge concentration of artillery fire upon it, mines beneath it, a big bang, and infantry poised to walk forward and mop up what was left, if anything. These tactics succeeded, but they would have continued the war into the next generation, so a compromise was found in the “step by step” battles. The “step by step” technique concentrated thorough preparation and overwhelming firepower onto a very limited sector of the German line, obliterated it, occupied it with infantry, then moved artillery forward and repeated the process. Three very satisfying steps were thus taken, at Menin Road, Polygon Wood, and Broodseinde, and Bean and many others began to think the war won. But after Broodseinde rain fell, and the next step into the terrible mud and slaughter of Passchendaele. Probably that was inevitable: it is difficult to imagine in France a stretch of dry weather long enough to enable the “step by step” method to chip through the German defences, while a halt for rain or winter allowed the Germans to build defences in the rear more quickly than the Allies could destroy them at the front. In short, during 1917 the Allied leaders failed to find a way to defeat the German Army. Yet the Allied experiments committed their soldiers to a year of toil and sacrifice. At the beginning of 1917 the AIF had five divisions on the Western Front, and in February began to raise a sixth – an attempt soon abandoned for want of men. Although each division was given some rest during the year, all were among the hardest worked British divisions. The Fourth Division in particular had a hard year: Bean knew that this was good division, and he took its experiences as testimony that by 1917 the British High Command was beginning to use Australians as storm troops. Certainly for most of the year they were attacking: early in February in the Le Sars-Gueudecourt sector, between February and April in following up the German withdrawal, in April and May at Bullecourt, in June at Messines, from July to November in the Ypres salient. In a rare defensive action, in April they fought off a determined German attack at Lagnicourt. These front line activities are at the core of Bean’s histories. His intellect told him that only at the front could a historian truly learn what happened in war (see for example p.xxxii, and Volume III, p. xxxix), but also his heart was with the front line men, and his writing is most alive when describing them. At the front men were most like the warriors of old he had grown to manhood admiring, and at the front he could best achieve his essential purpose of explaining how the war affected ordinary Australians, and revealed Australian character. To this end he undertook the largest oral history project ever attempted by an Australian, questioning hundreds of soldiers, as they came out of the line and again in after years, checking and filling the details of the history forming in his mind. By contrast, not only was he content merely to summarize command problems, but also it did not occur to him until February 1918 to portray the lives of soldiers in the back areas, and he never seriously depicted them on leave or in training, in France or in England. Yet in the front line his history is brilliant – unequalled elsewhere in military historical writing, rarely surpassed in literature, and setting the standard for good official histories throughout the western world. None of the twelve volumes of the Official Histories, however, treat so much so briefly as that for 1917. Even among the six volumes dealing with the Australian infantry, 1917, is relatively neglected. Although Bean focussed his writing on the experiences of front line soldiers, the following table shows that he covered the operations of 1917 less fully than those of any other part of the war: No of volumes Period covered Approximate period in front line (months) 2 August 1914 – December 1915 8 1 January – December 1916 7 1 January – November 1917 11 1 December 1917 – May 1918 3 1 May – November 1918 5 Yet in 1917 the AIF suffered its worst defeat, lost most prisoners, lost most casualties in a single battle, and probably suffered more casualties than in any other year of the war. 1917 was also significant in the development of the AIF front line experience: it provided the first clear evidence of that professionalism which was to flower so brilliantly in Australian operations in 1918. Finally 1917 was important to Bean: he tells us (p. xxxii) that the compilation of this volume, more than any other, proved the necessity of investigating front line experience in order to discover what actually happened in war, and in 1917 he found at Hermies in April, the first occasion in Australian experience in which a major operation went according to plan. So 1917 was significant for the AIF, and for what Bean wanted to say about the conduct of war and about writing military history. Why did he treat it relatively lightly? The 1917 volume was written during the Depression, between 1929 and 1932, which may have restricted Bean’s ability to gather material, but by 1929 he had assembled most of his evidence, and the events of 1917 had been limited to one volume at least by March 1919. It is just possible that Bean was not allowed to write two 1917 volumes at the expense of combining Volumes VIII, IX and X, as would have more proportionately reflected the Australian war effort, but so far as is known he had a free hand in planning his history. There are, however, signs that Bean found 1917 difficult to write about. It is central to understanding Bean to realise that his skills always remained those of a first-class observer and reporter. His own notes dictate his volumes: even though he realised in February 1918, for example, that soldiers in back areas were worth writing about, he does not seriously discuss them until Volume V, the volume dealing with early 1918, which he began writing in 1932. More obviously his personal experience of the war fires his narrative, and to the end of his work on the history in 1942, his text is vivid because his memory and his imagination remained clear. He often visited the front line, to see or to question or to photograph, and during battle he took the hurried but careful notes which later threaded his account together. For example, before First Bullecourt he got into an old infantry post to the right of Central Road near the Australian front line: “The snow had ceased to fall”, he recalled later, “It was bitterly cold – our hands froze as we sat there…in the dark…it was too cold to hold a pencil”. For a time nothing happens, then the artillery opens, and with a shivering hand Bean begins: “4.30 our bomb starts. 4.35 green flare from Bullecourt. 4.36…” and so on. These notes and the recollections they prompted appear on page 292, illustrating how the method of a skilled observer has shaped the final narrative. In the sense that they enable a reader to follow the observations and the feelings of a man who witnessed every major Australian engagement except Fromelles, Bean’s histories are autobiographical. For Bean 1917 was the low point of the war. A comparison of his final 1917 paragraphs (pp. 947-48) with those of any of his other volumes reflects the flatness and dismay he felt when he reviewed the year. To an extent this was because 1917 contributed relatively little to his essential purpose, to show how Australian citizens passed the test of war and founded a national tradition. 1915 was the year of Anzac, the nation-making year. 1916 was the year of Pozières, that climactic battle in which Australians first met and defeated German infantry, and which destroyed Edwardian Australia forever, and reshaped the mental boundaries of the known world. 1918 was the year of victory, and the year in which the Australians combined their formidable fighting skills and a new professionalism with such devastating effect. 1917 was the year in between. There is more to it than this. Certainly 1917 was the year of the “step by step” victories, which Bean treats most briefly of all, but in which the Australians made almost as much of their opportunities as in 1918. But 1917 was also a year of disaster: it began with a winter which Bean and others considered the worst experience the AIF ever endured, it continued with First Bullecourt, and despite the “step by step” victories it ended in the mud and despair of Passchendaele. Whereas 1916 and 1918 showed that men might still triumph over machines, that in the face of the German guns they might still take Pozières or Mont St Quentin, 1917 was the year in which machines and mud crushed remorselessly the highest endeavours and the most noble aspirations. This was a particular tragedy for Bean. Throughout his life he never abandoned his conviction that nations and peoples were made strong by the moral excellence of individuals. In olden days battles were won by the moral and physical strength of individual warriors, and in Bean’s own time Australia was being built by similar qualities in its pioneers. Bean’s vision of the ideal Australians, although broad, was quite specific. There were two ideal types – the Britisher and the bushman. Together these two types had built Australia, and together they spearheaded Australia’s magnificent achievements in the war. Bean’s notion of the Britisher derived from his heritage and upbringing. The Britisher was a gentleman and a leader, from a public school or with public school values, upright, brave and honourable. Most of the leaders Bean admired in the AIF, men like White, Gellibrand, the Leanes, the Howell-Prices, Humphrey Scott and Milligan were Britishers, while leaders Bean liked less, notably Monash and Elliott, often were not. Bean’s notion of the bushman probably began to inspire him in western New South Wales before the war. The bushman answered his search for an individual who might exemplify Australian national distinctiveness, and who with the Britisher might define Australian excellence. The bushman was the supreme individualist, the ideal nco – resourceful, brave, aggressive, never without a solution to any problem in the war or in the bush. If the Britisher showed how the public school system might preserve the highest capacities of the race in the far antipodes, the bushman showed how the Australian environment might actually improve the old stock. Although the two remained distinct, their values and capacities were to some extent interchangeable, and together they were capable of lifting a future Australia beyond the achievements even of the Old Country, and of explaining the brilliant record of the AIF during the war. 1917 dealt with Beans’ vision cruelly. In that year more than any other, so far as Australians were concerned, mud and the German artillery battered down individuals without distinction. Certainly the calibre of the Australian infantry allowed the AIF to maintain its distinctiveness and its reputation for excellence, but at the end of 1917 all men, Allied and German, seemed helpless before the caprice of the weather and the technology of the enemy. And between late 1916 and late 1917 Bean saw many of his heroes destroyed. Two of the Leanes, two of the Howell-Prices, and Humphrey Scott, all Britishers, were killed in this period, as was Harold Wanliss, whom Bean and others expected one day to be Prime Minister of Australia. And Percy Black, the best known bushman of all, “the old prospector, known from Yilgarn to the Murchison”, to many the bravest man in the AIF, was shot before the wire at Bullecourt. The same fate befell Australian formations in 1917. Bean described the Fourth Division before First Bullecourt as largely composed of country men, which in him was synonymous with stating that they were exceptionally fine soldiers (p. 281), and he considered the Fourth Brigade of the Division at this time as probably the best led brigade in the history of the AIF (pp.293-94). Yet this was the Division which suffered Australia’s worst defeat, and the Brigade which suffered most during it. Bean does not juxtapose magnificence and ruin. For him the loss was too great for such classical neatness, for in the wire and trenches at Bullecourt and amid the terrible disappointments of 1917 he saw his Australia – past, present, and future – destroyed. When he came to write of First Bullecourt in 1930 his grief was still apparent, and probably the pain of 1917 remained for the rest of his life. Indeed in some ways he never recovered from the war: except in relation to his racial and sectarian opinions, his ideas and his views of the world did not materially advance beyond that vision which began to inform his writing in 1915. He was a great Australian, he stands among Australia’s greatest historians, but like thousands of his comrades his world was destroyed by the war. This is worth remembering when reading how well he wrote about it. Yet Bean can mislead readers by what he does not say. For example, he is reluctant to name himself, and masks his presence by calling himself “an observer” or “an Australian”, or simply by using the passive voice – 1917 examples are on pages 429, 699n, and 754. This trait emerges even when Bean takes a part of some significance in events, and readers should be alert to it. More importantly, he is reluctant to condemn, especially senior officers, and especially if they were still alive. He is one of Haig’s more tolerant judges, for example, and he describes as sick at least one senior officer who got drunk before an attack. 1917 examples of this restraint are on pages 23-25, where Bean discussed changes in AIF command. Bean’s drafts suggest that he reworked these paragraphs often, each time softening his criticism. For example he dropped from page 23, paragraph 3, sentence 3 the phrase “just as the breakdown of any man under the physical or moral stresses of war was not regarded by his comrades as a disgrace… ” – presumably he felt any reference to breaking down unkind at this point. Again, pages 23-24 leave all but the most informed readers uncertain as to which general is being referred to when (sic). Bean’s draft of page 24 shows that at lines 6-12 he had in mind Legge certainly and M’Cay possibly, and that in note 11 the words “from the first” are ambiguous: more exactly he might have written “at first”, for Birdwood later reversed his opinion of M’Cay’s competence. Only on learning what Bean really means in these passages can a reader see why he chose to refer to the transfer of Legge and M’Cay before them, and Cox after them. Yet even Bean’s drafts are restrained, and his diary alone makes his own opinion clear. On 16 February he accused Legge, M’Cay, and Anderson, all named on page 24, of fighting for themselves rather than for victory, which was a crime in his eyes, and he observed, “…no doubt Birdwood made a mistake in not telling him [Legge] straight out he was not competent in the field”. On 17 February he named Legge as the source of the politicking in England he hinted at on page 24, and clearly he was furious at the cable Legge and Anderson sent behind Birdwood’s back to Australia, recommending M’Cay’s appointment to Salisbury Plain. To Bean this was disloyalty, and not at all how a Britisher should behave. His diary called Legge, M’Cay and Anderson “a set of crooked (men)”, yet only a shadow of these feelings appeared in his history. On page 24 Bean also discussed the transfer of Cox, a general he apparently admired. After “4th Division”, in line 8 of the last paragraph on page 24, Bean’s draft dropped the words “and who on December 20th was sent for a short rest to the south of France”. In other words, Bean decided not to say that Cox had no appointment at all for a time. The information would have at least have implied that Cox was among those generals referred to on page 23 as in need of a rest, or in Bean’s draft as having broken down, but apparently Cox took his dismissal like a Britisher – he did not politick – and so he had Bean’s approval. At the same time the words omitted leave more weight attached to Bean’s remaining explanation for Cox’s dismissal – that Cox was not an Australian – than Bean knew to be accurate. He therefore revised his draft, calling Cox an “Anglo-Indian” and in the same paragraph calling Legge’s replacement, Smyth, an “Anglo-Egyptian”, thereby conveying that Cox’s nationality was not the only factor in his transfer. In short a reader must be constantly alert to what Bean hints at. Nowhere is Bean consciously inaccurate, but he is far readier to praise than to blame, and at several points his account, both of command and of combat, displays a tax accountant’s facility in balancing accuracy and indirectness. These points of caution are easily outweighed by Bean’s strengths. Two in particular underlie his achievement. The first is his concern for accuracy. Except when condemning, his detail is meticulous and astonishingly thorough. Often he could have written an article, occasionally a book, on what he compressed into a footnote, and often he pursued small points long after the relevant volume was published, even until the end of his working life in 1964. Points of disagreement remain – in the 1917 volume for example he states that 48th Battalion scouts did not detect the beginning of the German withdrawal (p. 61) whereas that battalion’s history claims they did.1 Compare also Bean’s account of the remarkable incident involving Australians and New Zealanders on Bellevue Spur (pp. 918–19) with that in the Otago Regiment’s history.2 Yet Bean’s thoroughness and integrity is such that almost invariably his account can be relied upon. Bean’s second great strength is his sense of purpose. By 1915 at least he had determined to write not merely about soldiers, or about battles, but about a momentous experience in the lives of Australian civilians, and about how this shaped the history of their country. We have seen that he had firm opinions on how their heritage and their environment had moulded Australians before 1914. His histories trace how these fitted Australians for the test of war, and how this experience in turn showed the way to a future Australia. Bean’s histories never abandon these purposes: they form a mighty theme, and as in all great history, having something to say elevates his writing, lifting it beyond its time and context, to become what Bean says of the AIF, “a monument to great–hearted men; and for their nation, a possession for ever”.3 Bill Gammage Department of History University of Adelaide Notes W. Devine, ‘The Story of a Battalion’, (Melbourne: Melville & Mullen, 1919), pp. 69-70. A.E. Byrne, ‘Official History of the Otago Regiment, NZEF’, (Dunedin: J. Wilkie, 1919[?]), pp. 217-19. C.E.W. Bean, ‘The Story of Anzac’, The Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-1918, 12 vols (St Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1983), VI: 1096. The Australian Imperial Force in France, 1917 Preface to the First Edition THIS volume discovers four of the five Australian infantry divisions expecting relief after their most depressing experience, the winter of 1916-17 on the Somme. It next tells how, before that relief came, the Germans carried out, under the eyes of two British armies, an evacuation more extensive, if much less dangerous, than that executed by the Australian and other forces in Gallipoli. This episode is closely traced in the narrative, since the Australians for nearly a month were responsible for about half the front affected, and it is possible, for once, to prove from the records of the actual scouts, how difficult it is, even with the most vigilant reconnaissance, to prevent the orderly withdrawal of a well-organised modern army. There follow the “ pursuit ” of the enemy by two small columns and three weeks’ village-fighting under conditions of semi-open warfare ; then, on arrival at the Hindenburg Line, the two terrible attempts to force that line at Bullecourt, one of these being the first experiment with massed tanks, and each involving a “ soldiers’ battle ” of extraordinary interest, fought under highly adverse conditions. After these there comes at last, for most of the Australian infantry, its promised rest, generous beyond all hopes, while the hardest grained of the divisions, the 4th, together with the youngest and least tried, the 3rd, engages in an offensive very differently conducted from any within previous experience of the Australian infantry in France, the Battle of Messines. The volume ends with the participation of the two Anzac corps as the central striking force in the second of the three phases of what is popularly known as the “ Battle of Passchendaele.” The world has forgotten, if indeed it ever realised, that the story of this phase was for the most part one of unimpeded success. An endeavour is here made to show the reason, which is not, it is contended, to be found merely in the fine weather or the effectiveness of the two Anzac corps, although they now formed a highly expert and formidable force. In all this severe fighting the Australian divisions lost heavily. As only small reinforcements were now arriving from Australia, a serious problem of maintenance lay ahead ; and the volume ends with the necessary withdrawal of the divisions to a quiet front. The discrepancy between the developments of battle as described in the higher official reports, and as they appear actually to have occurred, has never been more deeply impressed upon the writer than in the present compilation. Perhaps the most striking example is afforded by the reference of the Commander-in-Chief to the First Battle of Bullecourt, quoted on pages 351-2; but at Messines and Polygon Wood also the leaders were unaware, both at the time and afterwards, of certain critical situations. The fact that, at a crucial moment at Messines, the 13th Australian Infantry Brigade extended the Australian line to cover nearly half the entire battle-front, and so filled a vital gap, is witnessed in the records of the 57th British Brigade, which was beyond the gap, and which says that it met the Australian flank that night; and in the records of the troops that were to have intervened, who state that they saw Australians and 57th Brigade closing in in front of them; and in the records of the 52nd Australian Battalion, which filled the gap and was thereafter reinforced by the gradual arrival of the intervening brigade. But the truth appears to have been totally unknown to the higher staffs, and even the commander of one of the brigades concerned expressed himself as "simply astounded" when the present narrative was submitted to him. The writer is indebted to innumerable officers and men, both Australian and British, for their generous help. The British Official Historian, Sir James Edmonds, has given most valuable advice, and the Australian War Memorial, the Canadian Historical Section, the Historical Section of the French Ministry of War, and the German Reichsarchiv have courteously responded to all requests for assistance. C. E. W. B. SYDNEY. 28th September, 1932. Please note: to avoid opening the book out, with the risk of damaging the spine, some of the pages were slightly raised on the inner edge when being scanned, which has resulted in some blurring to the text and a shadow on the inside edge of the final images. Colour reproduction is shown as accurately as possible but please be aware that some colours are difficult to scan and may result in a slight variation from the colour shown below to the actual colour. In line with eBay guidelines on picture sizes, some of the illustrations may be shown enlarged for greater detail and clarity. 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Please contact me with name, address and payment details within seven days of the end of the listing; otherwise I reserve the right to cancel the sale and re-list the item. Finally, this should be an enjoyable experience for both the buyer and seller and I hope you will find me very easy to deal with. If you have a question or query about any aspect (postage, payment, delivery options and so on), please do not hesitate to contact me. International buyers: To estimate the “packed weight” each book is first weighed and then an additional amount of 150 grams is added to allow for the packaging material (all books are securely wrapped and posted in a cardboard book-mailer). The weight of the book and packaging is then rounded up to the nearest hundred grams to arrive at the shipping figure. I make no charge for packaging materials and do not seek to profit from shipping and handling. Shipping can usually be combined for multiple purchases (to a maximum of 5 kilograms in any one parcel with the exception of Canada, where the limit is 2 kilograms). Packed weight of this item : approximately 1600 grams Please be aware that this is a large and heavy book, making international postage expensive International Shipping options: Details of the postage options to various countries (via Air Mail) can be obtained by selecting the “Postage and payments” option at the head of this listing (above) and then selecting your country of residence from the drop-down list. For destinations not shown or other requirements, please contact me before buying. Due to the extreme length of time now taken for deliveries, surface mail is no longer a viable option and I am unable to offer it even in the case of heavy items. I am afraid that I cannot make any exceptions to this rule. Payment options for international buyers: Payment can be made by: credit card (Visa or MasterCard, but not Amex) or PayPal. I can also accept a cheque in GBP [British Pounds Sterling] but only if drawn on a major British bank. Regretfully, due to extremely high conversion charges, I CANNOT accept foreign currency : all payments must be made in GBP [British Pounds Sterling]. This can be accomplished easily using a credit card, which I am able to accept as I have a separate, well-established business, or PayPal. Please contact me with your name and address and payment details within seven days of the end of the listing; otherwise I reserve the right to cancel the sale and re-list the item. Finally, this should be an enjoyable experience for both the buyer and seller and I hope you will find me very easy to deal with. If you have a question or query about any aspect (shipping, payment, delivery options and so on), please do not hesitate to contact me. Prospective international buyers should ensure that they are able to provide credit card details or pay by PayPal within 7 days from the end of the listing (or inform me that they will be sending a cheque in GBP drawn on a major British bank). Thank you. (please note that the book shown is for illustrative purposes only and forms no part of this auction) Book dimensions are given in inches, to the nearest quarter-inch, in the format width x height. Please note that, to differentiate them from soft-covers and paperbacks, modern hardbacks are still invariably described as being ‘cloth’ when they are, in fact, predominantly bound in paper-covered boards pressed to resemble cloth. Fine Books for Fine Minds I value your custom (and my feedback rating) but I am also a bibliophile : I want books to arrive in the same condition in which they were dispatched. For this reason, all books are securely wrapped in tissue and a protective covering and are then posted in a cardboard container. If any book is significantly not as described, I will offer a full refund. Unless the size of the book precludes this, hardback books with a dust-jacket are usually provided with a clear film protective cover, while hardback books without a dust-jacket are usually provided with a rigid clear cover. The Royal Mail, in my experience, offers an excellent service, but things can occasionally go wrong. However, I believe it is my responsibility to guarantee delivery. If any book is lost or damaged in transit, I will offer a full refund. Thank you for looking. Please also view my other listings for a range of interesting books and feel free to contact me if you require any additional information Design and content © Geoffrey Miller
Price: 69.99 GBP
Location: Flamborough, Bridlington
End Time: 2024-03-08T11:26:28.000Z
Shipping Cost: 28.53 GBP
Product Images
Item Specifics
Return postage will be paid by: Buyer
Returns Accepted: Returns Accepted
After receiving the item, your buyer should cancel the purchase within: 30 days
Return policy details: If any book is significantly not as described, I will offer a full refund, including return postage. All books are securely wrapped and posted in a cardboard container.
Binding: Hardback
Place of Publication: St Lucia
Non-Fiction Subject: History & Military
Language: English
Special Attributes: Dust Jacket, Illustrated
Author: Charles Edwin Woodrow Bean
Publisher: University of Queensland Press
Year Printed: 1982
